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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996), the Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction of this appeal from the Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
Dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint, dated June 16,1999. (R. 258-60).1
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF CLAIM PRECLUSION?
The district court's decision to dismiss the Complaint under the first branch of the

doctrine of res judicata, claim preclusion, should be reviewed for correctness. See Macris
& Associates v. Newavs. 986 P.2d 748, 749 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).2 This issue was
preserved below with Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Request for Oral Argument
(R. 21-22) and supporting memorandum (R. 24-107) filed by defendants-appellees Kent
Palmer and Robin Palmer ("Palmers") and the memorandum filed by plaintiff-appellant
Scholzen Products Company ("Scholzen") opposing the motion. (R. 110-238).

1

Because this appeal involves two lawsuits, the clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court
created two separate indexes which constitute the record in this appeal. Cites to the index
record in the instant action, Case No. 990500428, are indicated by "R" followed by the
page in the record in which the cited material appears. Cites to the index record in the
previous litigation between the parties, Case. No. 970500787, are indicated by "Rl"
followed by the page in the record in which the cited material appears.
2

Although the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Request for Oral Argument was
styled as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it
was properly treated as a motion for summary judgment by the district court because the
Palmers and Scholzen supported their respective memoranda with sources outside the
pleadings. See American Estate Mgmt. Corp. v. Int'l Investment & Development Corp.,
986 P.2d 765, n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).

308789.2

II.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF ISSUE PRECLUSION?
The district court's decision to dismiss the Complaint under the second branch of

the doctrine of res judicata, issue preclusion, should be reviewed for correctness. See
Macris & Associates. 986 P.2d at 749. This issue was preserved below with Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss and Request for Oral Argument (R. 21-22) and supporting
memorandum (R. 24-107) filed by the Palmers and the memorandum filed by Scholzen
opposing the motion. (R. 110-238).
III.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM U PON WHICH
RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED?
The district court's decision to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted should be reviewed for correctness. See Macris &
Associates. 986 P.2d at 749. This issue was preserved below with Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss and Request for Oral Argument (R. 21-22) and supporting memorandum (R. 24107) filed by the Palmers and the memorandum filed by Scholzen opposing the motion.
(R. 110-238).
IV.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE SCHOLZEN HAS SUFFERED NO
DAMAGES?
The district court's decision to dismiss the Complaint because Scholzen has

suffered no damages should be reviewed for correctness. See Macris & Associates. 986
P.2d at 749. This issue was preserved below with Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
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Request for Oral Argument (R. 21-22) and supporting memorandum (R. 24-107) filed by
the Palmers and the memorandum filed by Scholzen opposing the motion. (R. 110-238).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This appeal concerns a dispute between Scholzen and the Palmers over whether

the Palmers are obligated to provide an easement to Dale Dockstader ("Dockstader")
pursuant to a Settlement Agreement executed in April 1995 by Dockstader and Scholzen
("Settlement Agreement") or pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement dated May 4,
1995 between Scholzen and the Palmers ("Purchase Agreement").
In prior litigation commenced by Dockstader on April 30, 1997 against Scholzen
and the Palmers in the Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington County entitled Dale
Dockstader and Dale R. Huntsman v. Scholzen Products Co., Kent and Robin Palmer, et
aL, Case No. 970500787 ("Dockstader Litigation"), the Honorable G. Rand Beacham
ruled in a Memorandum Decision dated December 1, 1998, that the Palmers were not
obligated to provide an easement to Dockstader under either the Settlement Agreement or
the Purchase Agreement. Judge Beacham also ruled that Scholzen's Motion to Amend
Answer, Counterclaim and Crossclaim ("Motion to Amend") to allege causes of action
for fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith, and willful
misconduct against the Palmers was improper because the proposed causes of action were
brought late in the litigation and were based on alleged facts which Scholzen knew or
should have known from the outset of the litigation. (R. 104-05). Judge Beacham also
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ruled that there no factual basis for Scholzen's proposed causes of action against the
Palmers. (R. 105).
Not satisfied with Judge Beacham's rulings in the Dockstader Litigation, Scholzen
commenced this litigation by filing the Complaint against the Palmers on March 16,
1999. The causes of action in this litigation for fraud in the inducement, negligent
misrepresentation, bad faith, and willful misconduct are identical to the causes of action
that Scholzen belatedly attempted to bring in the Dockstader Litigation. (R. 1-12).
The Palmers sought dismissal of the Complaint on four separate grounds: (a) the
Complaint was barred by claim preclusion, the first branch of the doctrine of res judicata;
(b) the Complaint was barred by issue preclusion, the second branch of the doctrine of res
judicata; (c) the Complaint failed to state a claim against the Palmers upon which relief
could be granted; and (d) Scholzen had suffered no damages as a result of the Palmers'
conduct as alleged in the Complaint. (R. 21-22,24-107).
In its opposing memorandum, Scholzen argued that res judicata did not apply and
that it had been damaged by the Palmers' actions. Scholzen did not address or otherwise
dispute the Palmers' third ground for dismissal that the Complaint failed to state a claim
against the Palmers upon which relief could be granted. (R. 110-238).
At oral argument held on May 26, 1999, the Honorable James L. Shumate
dismissed the Complaint. (R. 270). On June 16,1999, Judge Shumate executed an Order
on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint. (R. 258-60).

308789 2
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II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
In contrast to Scholzen's Statement of Facts (App. Brief at 3-9), which, among

other things, omits certain important facts, mischaracterizes other facts and alleges facts
which are either not relevant to the issues before this Court or contain factual conclusions
or legal conclusions not supported by the record, the Palmers offer the following
Statement of Facts.
A.

The Palmers' Purchase of Scholzen's Interest in the Real Property.

In April 1995, Scholzen and Dockstader entered into the Settlement Agreement to
resolve certain disputes concerning the real property. (R. 48-55). The Settlement
Agreement provided that if either Scholzen or Dockstader sold their interest in the real
property to the Palmers, the selling party would obtain an easement from the Palmers. (R.
52-53). The Palmers were not parties to the Settlement Agreement. (R. 27-28).
On May 4, 1995, Scholzen sold its interest in the real property to the Palmers
pursuant to the Purchase Agreement. (R. 101; Rl. 517-29a). Scholzen, however, did not
obtain an easement from the Palmers as required by the Settlement Agreement with
Dockstader. Indeed, the Purchase Agreement does not mention the easement or the
Settlement Agreement. (R. 101).
Moreover, the Purchase Agreement is an integrated document. Paragraph 14 of
the Purchase Agreement expressly provides:
14. Entire Agreement. This Agreement sets forth the
entire understanding of Seller [Scholzen] and Buyer [the
Palmers] as to matters set forth herein and cannot be altered
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or otherwise amended except pursuant to an instrument in
writing signed by each of the parties hereto.
(R1.523a).
On September 30, 1996, the sale of the real property closed with Scholzen
executing and delivering a Warranty Deed conveying its interest in the real property to
the Palmers. The Warranty Deed does not mention the easement or the Settlement
Agreement. (R. 102).
B.

The Dockstader Litigation,

On April 30, 1997, Dockstader commenced the Dockstader Litigation by filing a
Complaint against Scholzen and the Palmers alleging that Scholzen breached the
Settlement Agreement by failing to obtain an easement from the Palmers and that the
Palmers had interfered with Dockstader's easement and breached their fiduciary duty as
co-tenants with Dockstader. (R. 39-55). The case was assigned to Judge G. Rand
Beacham.
On June 26, 1997, Scholzen filed an Answer and Counterclaim against Dockstader
and a Crossclaim against the Palmers. (R. 57-66). In its Answer, Scholzen affirmatively
alleged:
14. With regard to Paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs' Complaint,
Defendant Scholzen admits that the interest was transferred,
but denies each and every other allegation contained therein.
Further, Defendant Scholzen specifically alleges that
Defendant Scholzen obtained the specific representation and
promise from Defendant Palmer, that Defendant Palmer was
taking the property subject to said agreement and would
deliver all portions of the contract requirements, including but
not limited to the twenty-foot easement.
308789.2
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* * *

17. With regard to Paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs' Complaint,
Defendant Scholzen claims that the document speaks for itself
and affirmatively alleges that Defendant Scholzen performed
all of its duties to the Plaintiffs by selling said interest in said
property to Defendant Palmer, subject to the settlement
agreement. Further, Defendant Scholzen affirmatively alleges
that Defendant Scholzen provided notice of all of these
transactions to Plaintiffs by and through counsel.
(R. 59).
Further, Scholzen alleged in its Counterclaim against Dockstader:
7.
That at the time the property interest was sold to
Defendant Palmer, and prior thereto, Counterclaimant
Scholzen specifically informed Defendant Palmer of
Defendant Palmer's duty and responsibility to provide a 20foot easement pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.
8.
That at the time of the sale of the interest in the subject
property, Defendant Palmer, for themselves and by and
through counsel, affirmed Defendant Palmer's responsibility
to provide an appropriate easement as required in the
described Settlement Agreement.
(R. 61).
Similarly, Scholzen alleged in its Crossclaim against the Palmers:
6.
That at the time the property interest was sold to
Crossclaim Defendant Palmer, and prior thereto,
Crossclaimant Scholzen specifically informed Crossclaim
Defendant Palmer of Crossclaim Defendant Palmer's duty
and responsibility to provide a 20-foot easement pursuant to
the Settlement Agreement.
7.
That at the time of the sale of the interest in the subject
property, Crossclaim Defendant Palmer, for themselves and
by and through counsel, affirmed Crossclaim Defendant
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Palmer's responsibility to provide an appropriate easement as
required in the described Settlement Agreement.
* * *

12. That Crossclaim Defendant Palmer accepted the
property with the responsibility of obtaining the easement
directly from Dockstader, and that, as such, Crossclaim
Defendant Palmer should indemnify Crossclaimant Scholzen
for any costs or expenses incurred in defending this action,
including attorney's fees, etc.
(R. 63-65).
The Palmers filed their Answer to Dockstader's Complaint on July 11, 1997. In
their Answer, the Palmers specifically denied Dockstader's allegations and in their
Thirteenth Affirmative Defense, alleged that the Settlement Agreement was not binding
on the Palmers. (Rl. 35-41).
The Palmers filed their Answer to Scholzen's Crossclaim on July 29, 1997. In
their Answer, the Palmers specifically denied Scholzen's allegations and in their Twelfth
Affirmative Defense, alleged that the Settlement Agreement was not binding on the
Palmers. (RL 44-49).
On August 19, 1997, Dockstader filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
The grounds for Dockstader's motion were that Scholzen had not obtained a binding
agreement with the Palmers for the easement as required by the Settlement Agreement.
(Rl. 49-85).
In support of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Dockstader included the
following undisputed facts, supported by the Affidavit of Dale Dockstader:

308789.2
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4.
The Purchase and Sale Agreement is silent with
regards to the Settlement Agreement between Dockstader and
Scholzen. Furthermore, the Purchase and Sale Agreement
fails to contain any language contractually obligating the
Palmers' [sic] to provide a 20 foot wide strip of their property
to be combined with the existing 20 foot wide access so as to
provide a 40 foot wide roadway access to the 28 acre parcel
[the easement].
* * *

10. Neither the Warranty Deed nor the Trust Deed impose
a duty upon the Palmers to provide a 20 foot wide strip of
their property for access to the 28 acre parcel of property [the
easement].
11. After the closing Dockstader learned that Scholzen had
not obtained a binding agreement with the Palmers regarding
the additional 20 foot wide access [the easement].
* * *

13.
Dockstader has attempted to negotiate with the
Palmers but the Palmers refuse to deed, by way of easement
or otherwise, a 20 foot wide parcel of their property for access
to the 28 acre parcel of property [the easement].
(Rl. 52-53, 88-91).
On May 28, 1998, Scholzen filed a memorandum opposing Dockstader's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment. (Rl. 103-94). In its memorandum, Scholzen argued that
it had "obtained the agreement" of the Palmers to provide the easement because:
[I]t is clear that Defendant Palmer were [sic] aware of the
Settlement Agreement, knew the terms of the Settlement
Agreement, helped draft the important provisions of the
Settlement Agreement that apply in this particular case,
evaluated with the help of counsel the chain of title which
included Quit-Claim Deeds which had the specific deed
restriction, and finally, Defendant Palmer began negotiations
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for the delivery of an easement immediately following the
closing of the sale between Defendant Scholzen and
Defendant Palmer.
(Rl. 110).
On June 3, 1998, Dockstader filed the Supplemental Affidavit of Dale Dockstader,
in which Dockstader states:
4.
[After learning that Scholzen had not obtained an
easement from the Palmers], I thereafter confronted
Scholzen's officers regarding their failure to obtain an
agreement from the Palmers regarding [the easement]. The
officers told me that they were not obligated to obtain that
agreement, but that I would have to negotiate the matter with
the Palmers.
5.
I then tried to negotiate the matter with the Palmers.
They only offered to deed an additional 10 foot wide strip of
property, rather than the 20 foot wide strip. In addition, the
Palmers added the condition that the 10 foot wide strip could
not be used as a roadway, but instead could only be used as a
utility easement. The Palmers have never agreed to donate 20
additional feet of their property to be used as a roadway [the
easement].
6.
In addition, the Palmers have never acknowledged that
they are obligated by their purchase of the Scholzen property
to provide the additional 20 foot wide strip for a roadway
access [the easement]."
(Rl. 201-03).
On June 22, 1998, Scholzen filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the
Crossclaim against the Palmers.

(Rl. 206-07, 208-301).

In support of its motion,

Scholzen argued the same facts it argued in opposing Dockstader's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. (Rl. 208-14).

308789.2
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On July 7, 1998, the Palmers filed an opposing memorandum and affidavits to
Scholzen's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, specifically arguing that the Purchase
Agreement, which is an integrated document, does not mention the Settlement Agreement
or the easement and that at "no time did the Palmers agree to be bound by the Settlement
Agreement or to grant Dockstader an additional twenty-foot easement as a condition of
the purchase of the Property." (Rl. 309-55).
In the hearing held on July 16, 1998, Judge Beacham denied Scholzen's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment (Rl. 375), observing there were no facts, even
unsupported facts, which would indicate that the Palmers agreed to provide Dockstader
with an easement or that the Palmers were bound by the Settlement Agreement. (R. 2728). Specifically, Judge Beacham stated:
In addition, considering the general merits of [Scholzen's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment], there are no facts
even unsupported and stated by [Scholzen] to indicate that the
Palmers accepted paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement
to which they were not parties and in the Purchase and Sale
Agreement to which the Palmers agreed there is no
requirement that they grant the easement and that [the]
Purchase and Sale Agreement is stated to be, by its own
terms, an integrated document
In addition, I find that
even if all of Scholzen's statements of fact were properly
supported and to be construed in its favor, which would be
opposite of the construction the rules would require, the
motion would fail as a matter of law because it fails to
establish that the plaintiff is entitled as a matter of law to hold
the Palmers to an agreement or a term of agreement that is not
anywhere in any document signed by them
(R. 27-28).

308789.2
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Dockstader dismissed the Palmers from the Dockstader Litigation on September
17,1998. (Rl. 382-84).
On October 14, 1998, the Palmers filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on
Scholzen's Crossclaim on the grounds that there were no statutory, contractual or
equitable bases for Scholzen's claim that the Palmers were obligated to provide an
easement to Dockstader. (Rl. 416-30).
On October 15, 1998, a day after the Palmers filed their Motion for Summary
Judgment, Scholzen filed a Motion to Amend Answer, Counterclaim and Crossclaim (the
"Motion to Amend"). (Rl. 431-83). The proposed amended Crossclaim, identical in
almost every respect to the Complaint in this appeal, asserted causes of action for fraud in
the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith-rescission, bad faith-damages and
willful misconduct-punitive damages. (R. 67-90).
Also on October 15, 1998, Dockstader filed a Second Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Against Scholzen. (Rl. 484-533). The grounds for Dockstader's motion were
that Scholzen breached the Settlement Agreement by failing to obtain the agreement of
the Palmers to provide the easement. (Rl. 487-88). In support of his motion, Dockstader
argued essentially the same facts as he did in support of his first Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. This time, the facts were supported by the depositions of Dale
Dockstader and Bruce Ballard, president of Scholzen. (Rl. 488-92).
The Palmers opposed Scholzen's Motion to Amend on the grounds that it was late
in the course of the Dockstader Litigation and that the proposed new causes of action
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were futile. (Rl. 555-60). Specifically, the Palmers argued that Scholzen's proposed
new causes of action were not supported by any new factual allegations. Therefore, the
Palmers argued, these new claims failed as a matter of law because Scholzen offered no
new evidence to support these claims. (Rl. 558-59).
A hearing was held on these motions on November 12, 1998. (R. 98). After
hearing oral argument, after reviewing the parties' memoranda, affidavits and exhibits,
and after reviewing relevant Utah law, Judge Beacham issued a Memorandum Decision
on December 1, 1998 granting Dockstader's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
against Scholzen, granting Palmers' Motion for Summary Judgment against Scholzen,
and denying Scholzen's Motion to Amend (R. 98-107).
In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Beacham specifically found the following
facts in response to Scholzen's arguments that the Palmers' agreed to provide the
easement:
On May 4, 1995, Scholzen and the Palmers entered into a
Purchase and Sale Agreement for Palmers to purchase
Scholzen's interest in the Subject Property. This Purchase
and Sale Agreement made no mention of the Settlement
Agreement between Scholzen and Dockstader, and did not
include any agreement obligating Palmers to 'donate 20
additional feet of their property.'
* * *

The Scholzen/Palmer agreement was closed near the end of
September of 1996, and Scholzen's interest in the Subject
Property was conveyed to Palmers. Neither the deed
conveying Scholzen's interest nor any other document
contains any agreement by Palmers to donate additional
footage as required by the Settlement Agreement. Palmers
308789.2
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have never agreed to be bound by the Settlement Agreement
or to grant Dockstader any additional footage.
(R. 101-02).
Judge Beacham's decision then analyzed whether Scholzen obtained an agreement
from the Palmers as required by the Settlement Agreement. In finding that Scholzen did
not obtain an agreement from the Palmers, Judge Beacham found:
Scholzen also argues that it did obtain an agreement with
Palmers, but can provide no admissible evidence of such an
agreement; Scholzen cannot rely on discussions between
Dockstader and Palmers, especially those occurring after it
sold its interest in the Subject Property, to meet its own presale obligations. Scholzen argues that it was misled, that it
relied on alleged representations regarding [Dockstader's]
discussions with Palmers, that paragraph 14 was a mistake
(apparently a unilateral mistake), and that Palmers were, in
some unidentified way, bound by the Settlement Agreement
to which they were not a party or signatory. Scholzen has
provided absolutely no admissible evidence to support these
arguments, however. Scholzen also argues about what it
would have done or would not have done, but for the alleged
representations and mistakes, but it cannot identify any
manner in which it obtained from Palmers either an easement
or an agreement for an easement or additional footage. Even
if statute of fraud issues and the inadmissibility of some of
Scholzen's offered evidence are ignored for the sake of
argument, Scholzen has identified nothing to demonstrate that
it even attempted to meet its obligation, except vague and
truly ambiguous allusions in (a) one fax cover sheet from
[Dockstader5 s] attorney and (b) one noncommittal letter from
Palmers' attorney, prior to his receipt of a title insurance
commitment, requesting information on Scholzen's agreement
with [Dockstader].
(R. 101-03).
Finally, Judge Beacham denied Scholzen's Motion to Amend because
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Scholzen's proposed amendments are brought late in this
litigation, after considerable discovery, time and expense, but
are based on alleged facts of which Scholzen seems to have
had, or should have had, knowledge of from very near the
outset of this case without providing the Court with an
adequate explanation for the delay . . . Furthermore,
Scholzen's proposed amended crossclaims are all in the
nature of tort claims, while the subject of this action and all
discovery conducted by the parties has involved, to this point,
only contract claims. As a general rule, tort actions and
claims for punitive damages are not actionable within a
contract claim, unless the alleged acts also support a cause of
action in tort, [internal citations omitted] In addition,
Scholzen has demonstrated virtually no factual basis for the
proposed claims, and the courts generally refuse to allow
leave to amend the pleadings when the proposed changes
appear futile.
(R. 104-05).
C.

The Litigation Between Scholzen and the Palmers,

On March 16, 1999, Scholzen filed the Complaint against the Palmers asserting
causes of action forfraudin the inducement-rescission, fraud in the inducement-damages,
negligent misrepresentation, bad faith-rescission, bad faith-damages and willful
misconduct-punitive damages. (R. 1-12). The Complaint is virtually identical to the
proposed Amended Crossclaim filed by Scholzen in the Dockstader Litigation. (R. 1-12).
Indeed, in support of the Complaint, Scholzen alleged the following facts:
10. In December of 1994, Palmer made inquiry into the
Settlement Agreement involving Scholzen and Dockstader.
* * *

13. Between February 9, 1995, and March 30, 1995,
Palmer and Dockstader entered into discussions regarding
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easements and access to the property subject to the Settlement
Agreement.
14. Pursuant to the discussions between Palmer and
Dockstader, a paragraph was proposed by Dockstader to
Scholzen, regarding access and easements to the property
subject to the Settlement Agreement.
15. That the terms and conditions of the language to be
added to the Settlement Agreement were discussed between
Dockstader and Palmer, and Dockstader and Palmer came to a
consensus as to the terms and conditions of the language to be
added to the Settlement Agreement.3
* * *

18. On the 4 ^ day of May, 1995, documents were
delivered to Palmer, personally, which documents included
the April, 1995, Settlement Agreement which included the
new Paragraph 14, together with copies of Quit-Claim Deeds,
made pursuant to the April, 1995 Settlement Agreement,
which contained the terms 'subject to the terms of the
Settlement Agreement entered into between grantor and
grantee on February 9, 1995, which Settlement Agreement
discusses issues of access to the property between grantor atnd
grantee, and a co-tenancy agreement regarding development
of said property.'4
19. On the 30 t h day of May, 1995, Palmer acknowledged
that the property subject to the [Purchase Agreement] was
subject to a Settlement Agreement and a co-tenancy
agreement.

3

Interestingly, Scholzen admitted in the Dockstader Litigation that Dockstader and the
Palmers did not discuss the Settlement Agreement and they did not come to a consensus
about paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement. Thus, the allegations in paragraphs 1315 of the Complaint have been specifically refuted. (Rl. 555-60).
4

This paragraph fails to state that the documents which were delivered involved the
Purchase Agreement with its integration clause.
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20.
On the 30 th day of May, 1995, Palmer, by and through
their counsel of record, acknowledged that Palmer had been
provided with a copy of the Settlement Agreement, undated,
between Dockstader; another third-party, namely, Huntsman;
Russell J. Gallian and Scholzen.
21.
From May 4, 1995, to and including the 30^ day of
September, 1996, Palmer, for themselves and by and through
their attorney, Shawn Ferrin, performed extensive 'due
diligence', pursuant to the [Purchase Agreement], verbally
and in writing.

24.
On or before the 30 th day of September, 1996, Clifford
V. Dunn, for and on behalf of Scholzen, requested a deed
restriction from Shawn Ferrin, attorney for Palmer, which
deed restriction would reference the Settlement Agreement
between Dockstader and Scholzen, which is the subject of this
litigation. Shawn Ferrin indicated that Palmer was out of
town and would not be able to review the deed restriction.
Shawn Ferrin further indicated that Palmer was fully aware of
the requirement to provide a 20-foot easement for access
across his property and further that Palmer would be subject
to the Settlement Agreement. Shawn Ferrin indicated that
Palmer's portion of the purchase agreement was subject to a
1031 exchange, and that the closing had to be completed by
the 30^ of September, 1996, or Palmer would lose their 1031
exchange favorable tax treatment. Shawn Ferrin, for and in
behalf of Palmer, requested that Scholzen execute the
Warranty Deed as it was prepared by him, without deed
restriction, as an accommodation to Palmer, and that Palmer
would thereafter acknowledge and be responsible for the
Settlement Agreement.
25.
In reliance upon the specific representations of Shawn
Ferrin, for and in behalf of Palmer, to Clifford V. Dunn, as
attorney for Scholzen, and based upon the specific
understanding by Scholzen that the Warranty Deed and the
other agreements for the sale were not intended to be a fully
integrated agreement, such that Palmer would be subject to
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the Settlement Agreement, Scholzen executed the Warranty
Deed and concluded the closing.
26.
That at the time the property interest was sold to
Palmer, and prior thereto, Scholzen specifically informed
Palmer of Palmer's duty and responsibility to provide a 20foot easement pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.
* * *

31.
That Palmer accepted the property with the
responsibility of delivering the easement for access directly to
Dockstader.
(R. 2-6).
These are essentially the same facts that formed the basis for the Crossclaim in the
Dockstader Litigation. (R. 28-30).
On April 12, 1999, the Palmers filed their Motion to Dismiss and Request for Oral
Argument. (R. 21-23). In their supporting memorandum, the Palmers argued three
separate grounds for dismissal: (a) the Complaint was barred by the doctrine of res
judicata; (b) the Complaint failed to state a claim against the Palmers upon which relief
could be granted; and (c) Scholzen had suffered no damages as a result of the Palmers'
conduct as alleged in the Complaint. (R. 24-107).
On May 5, 1999, Scholzen filed a memorandum and affidavit in opposition to the
Palmers' Motion to Dismiss. (R. 110-238). In its memorandum, Scholzen solely argued
that res judicata did not apply and it had been damaged by the Palmers' actions. Scholzen
did not refute or otherwise oppose the Palmers' argument that Scholzen failed to allege
sufficient facts in the Complaint to support its causes of action for fraud in the
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inducement-rescission, fraud in the inducement-damages, negligent misrepresentation,
bad faith-rescission, bad faith damages and willful misconduct-punitive damages. (R.
110-238).
On May 26, 1999, Judge Shumate heard oral argument on the Palmers' Motion to
Dismiss. (R. 270). At the conclusion of oral argument, Judge Shumate granted the
Palmers' Motion to Dismiss. (R. 270). On June 16, 1999, Judge Shumate executed the
Palmers' Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Dismissal of Plaintiffs
Complaint. (R. 258-60).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court correctly dismissed the Complaint because Scholzen's claims
against the Palmers are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The purpose of res judicata
is to prevent "pointless litigation" and "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple
lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions,
encourage reliance on adjudication." Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc..
758 P.2d 451, 453 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 395). These
are "vital public interests." American Estate Mgmt. Corp.. 986 P.2d at 767.
The Complaint filed by Scholzen was nothing more than a belated attempt to bring
claims against the Palmers that were either dismissed or could have and should have been
brought in the Dockstader Litigation. Indeed, Scholzen, based upon admissions contained
in its own pleadings, knew all of the facts alleged in support of these claims before or
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immediately after the commencement of the Dockstader Litigation. Thus, the Complaint
was barred by claim preclusion, the first branch of the doctrine of res judicata.
The Complaint was also barred by issue preclusion, the second branch of the
doctrine of res judicata because several of Judge Beacham's findings in the Dockstader
Litigation were determinative of key issues raised in this case.

Specifically, Judge

Beacham found that the Palmers never agreed to be bound by the Settlement Agreement
or provide an easement to Dockstader. Issue preclusion barred Scholzen from relitigating
these issues and consequently, Scholzen's claims against the Palmers for fraud in the
inducement, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith and willful misconduct fail as a matter
of law.
The Complaint was also correctly dismissed because, res judicata notwithstanding,
Scholzen failed to plead any facts sufficient to support its claims against the Palmers and
Scholzen had suffered no damages as a result of the Palmers' alleged conduct.
Accordingly, as stated above and as more fully set forth below, the district court
properly dismissed the Complaint on the basis of res judicata, failure to state a claim on
which relief could be granted and no damages. This Court should affirm the district
court's dismissal of the Complaint.
ARGUMENT
L

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS OF CLAIM PRECLUSION.
The doctrine of res judicata "reflects the refusal of courts to tolerate pointless

litigation and is based on the premise that the proper administration of justice is best
308789.2
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served by limiting parties to one fair trial of an issue or cause." Trimble Real Estate, 758
P.2d at 453. Res judicata has two separate but related branches that can be asserted as
affirmative defenses.

The first branch, now known as claim preclusion, bars the

relitigation by the parties or their privies of a claim for relief previously resolved by a
final judgment on the merits.5 It also prevents relitigation of claims that could have and
should have been litigated in the prior action but were not. Id.
The district court correctly dismissed the Complaint under claim preclusion
because the causes of action asserted by Scholzen in the Complaint were either previously
resolved by Judge Beacham's ruling on the Palmers' Motion for Summary Judgment or
could have and should have been brought in the Dockstader Litigation but were not.
Indeed, all of the facts givingriseto these causes of action arose prior to Scholzen's filing
of its Crossclaim against the Palmers in the Dockstader Litigation.
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, Scholzen's claims for fraud in the
inducement, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith and willful misconduct in this
litigation are barred by the judgment in the Dockstader Litigation if (1) both cases involve
the same parties, their privities or assignees; (2) Scholzen's claims were presented or
could have been presented in the Dockstader Litigation; and (3) there was a final

5

A claim, or cause of action, is generally defined as a "the aggregate of operative facts
which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts." A claim is the "situation or state of
facts which entitles a party to sustain an action and gives him the right to seek judicial
interference in his behalf." Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care. 766 P.2d 1059,1062
(Utah 1988) (internal citations omitted).
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judgment on the merits in the Dockstader Litigation. See Murdock v. Springville Mun.
Corp. fin re General Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water), 982 P.2d
65, 70 (Utah 1999); Fitzgerald v. Corbett 793 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 1990). If these
elements are satisfied, the judgment in the Dockstader Litigation is final and serves as the
full measure of relief to be accorded between Scholzen and the Palmers. See American
Estate Mgmt. Corp.. 986 P.2d at 767.
Scholzen concedes that the first element is met in this case because Scholzen and
the Palmers were both parties to the Dockstader Litigation. (App. Brief at 28). Scholzen,
however, argues that the second and third elements are not satisfied in this case. (App.
Brief at 28-32). Scholzen's arguments reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the
doctrine of claim preclusion. As addressed below, the second and third elements of claim
preclusion are clearly met in this case because Scholzen could have and should have
brought these claims in the Dockstader Litigation.

Consequently, the district court

properly dismissed the Complaint on the basis of claim preclusion.
A,

Scholzen's Claims Could Have or Should Have Been Brought in the
Dockstader Litigation,

The second requirement of claim preclusion is satisfied if the claims that are
asserted to be barred were presented or could have been presented in the first case. In re
General Determination. 982 P.2d at 70; Fitzgerald. 793 P.2d at 359. This requirement
"reflects the expectation that parties who are given the capacity to present their ' entire
controversy' shall in fact do so." American Estate Mgmt. Corp.. 986 P.2d at 768 (quoting
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Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works. 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). If a party fails,
purposefully or negligently to do so, the party "will not afterward be permitted to deny
the correctness of that determination, nor to relitigate the same matters between the same
parties." Id. Thus, the second element of claim preclusion is met in this case because the
Complaint consists solely of claims against the Palmers that could have or should have
been brought in the Dockstader Litigation.
In determining whether the claims were presented or could have been presented in
the previous litigation, this Court reviews whether the new claim is based on essentially
the same operative facts as the prior claim. If so, the new claim is barred by res judicata
even though the new claim for relief alleges a different legal theory for recovery. See
Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme Inc.. 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983). Thus, the doctrine of
claim preclusion "requires assertion of all theories for relief against a defendant with
respect to all or part of a transaction, or series of transactions out of which the action
arose." Lane v. Honeywell Inc.. 663 F.Supp. 370, 373 (D.Utah 1987). In other words,
claims are identical when the same evidence supports both the present and former cause
of action. State in Interest of J.J.T.. 877 P.2d 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing Round
Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. B-Neva. Inc.. 606 P.2d 176 (Nev. 1980)). Moreover, if
the only reason the claim was not decided in the prior action was because the party failed
to raise it, the claim is barred by claim preclusion. Ringwood. 786 P.2d at 1356 (claims
that were not brought in prior litigation regarding two settlement agreements barred by
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claim preclusion because "the reason the claim was not litigated was solely because of
[the party's] failure to assert the claim.").
Applying the above principles to this case, it is apparent that Schotzen's claims for
fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith and willful misconduct are
barred by claim preclusion because these claims were based on facts which Scholzen
knew prior to or immediately after the commencement of the Dockstader Litigation.
Thus, these claims could have and should have been brought in the Dockstader Litigation.
Although the Complaint alleged new legal theories against the Palmers, the factual
support for these new legal theories is virtually the same as the factual support for
Scholzen's Crossclaim in the Dockstader Litigation. Even a cursory comparison of facts
alleged in Scholzen's Crossclaim with the facts alleged in the Complaint underscores this
point.

For example, Scholzen's Crossclaim in the Dockstader Litigation made the

following factual allegations:
6.
That at the time [Scholzen's interest in the Property]
was sold to [the Palmers], and prior thereto, [Scholzen]
specifically informed [the Palmers of their] duty and
responsibility to provide a 20-foot easement pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement.
7.
That at the time of the sale of [Scholzen's interest in
the Property, the Palmers] for themselves and by and through
counsel, affirmed [their] responsibility to provide an
appropriate easement as required in the described Settlement
Agreement.
* * *

12. That [the Palmers] accepted the Property with the
responsibility of obtaining the easement directly from
308789 2
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Dockstader, and that, as such, [the Palmers] should indemnify
[Scholzen] for any costs or expenses incurred in defending
[the Dockstader Litigation], including attorneys' fees, etc.
(R.64-65).
Although the wording has been changed and a few "new facts" added, the
Complaint is nothing more than an expanded, puffed-up version of the Crossclaim.6 As
such, the Complaint is barred by claim preclusion. As this Court explained in American
Estate Mgmt. Corp., plaintiffs are "not entitled to pursue their claims . . . through
piecemeal litigation, offering one legal theory to the court while holding others in reserve
for future litigation should the first prove unsuccessful." 986 P.2d at 769.
Scholzen's argument "that there were never enough facts presented to warn
Scholzen of thefraud,negligent misrepresentation, bad faith or willful misconduct" of the
Palmers until late 1998 is simply not credible, much less persuasive. As a practical
matter, Scholzen knew that the Palmers had not provided Dockstader with an easement
prior to the commencement of the Dockstader Litigation. Indeed, the Palmers' refusal to
provide Dockstader with an easement was the impetus for the Dockstader Litigation. At
the very latest, Scholzen knew that the Palmers did not intend to be bound by the
Settlement Agreement when the Palmers filed their Answer to Scholzen's Crossclaim in

6

An example of Scholzen's so-called "new facts" is a telephone conversation between
counsel for the Palmers and Mr. Dunn, counsel for Scholzen, in which counsel for the
Palmers allegedly told Mr. Dunn that the Palmers would be bound by the Settlement
Agreement. This telephone call, however, occurred several months before the
commencement of the Dockstader Litigation. (R. 4-5).
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July 1997. In their Answer, the Palmers specifically denied that they agreed to provide an
easement to Dockstader or that they purchased Scholzen's interest in the real property
subject to the Settlement Agreement. (Rl. 45-46). The Palmers' position was further
explicitly stated in their Twelfth Affirmative Defense that the Settlement Agreement was
not binding on them. (R. 47-48). The Palmers' good faith attempts to resolve the
Dockstader Litigation by negotiating with Dockstader does not change the fact that the
Palmers have consistently asserted from the outset of the Dockstader Litigation that they
are not obligated to provide Dockstader with an easement pursuant to either the
Settlement Agreement, to which they are not parties, or the Purchase Agreement, which is
an integrated document.
Judge Beacham's decision in the Dockstader Litigation further eviscerates
Scholzen's argument. In denying Scholzen's Motion to Amend (R. 104), Judge Beacham
found that Scholzen's arguments of ignorance and surprise meritless:
Scholzen's proposed amendments are brought late in this
litigation, after considerable discovery, time and expense, but
are based on alleged facts of which Scholzen seems to have
had, or should have had, knowledge of from very near the
outset of this case without providing the Court with an
adequate explanation for the delay
Furthermore,
Scholzen's proposed amended crossclaims are all in the
nature of tort claims, while the subject of this action and all
discovery conducted by the parties has involved, to this point,
only contract claims. As a general rule, tort actions and
claims for punitive damages are not actionable within a
contract claim, unless the alleged acts also support a cause of
action in tort, [internal citations omitted] In addition,
Scholzen has demonstrated virtually no factual basis for the
proposed claims, and the courts generally refuse to allow

308789.2

26

leave to amend the pleadings when the proposed changes
appear futile.
(R. 104-05).7
Scholzen's statement that "[generally people do not know when they are being
defrauded" is similarly flawed. (App. Brief at 30). Scholzen certainly knew all of the
facts that it now claims supports its cause of action forfraud,negligent misrepresentation,
bad faith and willful misconduct. Because Scholzen knew or should have known all of
the facts alleged in support of the Complaint prior to or soon after the commencement of
the Dockstader Litigation, Scholzen's claims for fraud in the inducement, negligent
misrepresentation, bad faith and willful misconduct should have been brought in the
Dockstader Litigation.
The district court's decision to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds of claim
preclusion is consistent with the recent case of Macris & Associates, supra. Here, the
factual bases for Scholzen's claims against the Palmers for fraud in the inducement,
negligent misrepresentation, bad faith, and willful misconduct arose before Scholzen filed
the Crossclaim because Scholzen knew or should have know of all of the facts giving rise
to these claims prior to Scholzen's filing of the Crossclaim. Macris & Associates. 986
P.2d at 750-751.

7

In its brief, Scholzen takes issue with Judge Beacham's decision to deny its Motion to
Amend. (App. Brief at 31-32). This is not the proper forum, however, for Scholzen to
appeal Judge Beacham's denial of its Motion to Amend.
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Judge Beacham's denial of Scholzen's Motion to Amend does not change this
result. Scholzen's statement that it "was not allowed to bring those claims" in the
Dockstader Litigation (App. Brief at 29) is misleading. Scholzen waited for well over a
year after the Palmers filed their Answer denying any obligation to provide the easement
to file the Motion to Amend. Contrary to Scholzen's assertions, Judge Beacham did not
deny the Motion to Amend for the primary reason that the Dockstader Litigation involved
contract claims and the proposed claims were tort claims.

Rather, Judge Beacham

determined that the Motion to Amend was too late in the game because Scholzen knew or
should have known of the facts giving rise to these claims from the outset of the case.
The fact that these claims were tort claims merely highlighted the prejudice to the
Palmers at this late stage of the Dockstader Litigation. More importantly, however, Judge
Beacham denied Scholzen's Motion because there was simply no evidence to support
these claims and the Motion to Amend would have been futile.
And, as Judge Beacham appropriately recognized, Scholzen knew or should have
known of all of the facts giving rise to these tort claims at or near the commencement of
the Dockstader Litigation. Thus, Scholzen's failure to assert these claims in a timely
manner does not preclude the application of claim preclusion.

Indeed, this Court's

decision in Ringwood is equally applicable in this case:
The court in the prior action determined that the October note
was nullified by merger into the November agreement so that
Ringwood could not assert a claim under the October note.
Since Ringwood failed to assert a claim under the November
agreement either initially or by amendment to his complaint,
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the case was properly dismissed. Obviously, a claim by
Ringwood under the prior agreement could have been decided
in the prior action, as the agreement was extant and was in
default. The only reason it was not decided was because
Ringwood failed to raise the claim
However, the reason
the claim was not litigated was solely because of Ringwood's
failure to assert the claim.
786P.2datl357.
Finally, Scholzen cannot save its claims by arguing that they are "tort claims" not
"contract claims" and therefore the doctrine of claims preclusion does not apply. (App.
Brief at. 28-32). Utah courts have repeatedly held that claim preclusion applies to all
claims that "could have or should have been brought" in previous litigation between the
parties. American Estate Mgmt. Corp.. 986 P.2d at 768. Thus, Scholzen's tort claims are
barred, not because they are identical to the claims asserted in the Dockstader Litigation,
but because they could have and should have been brought in the Dockstader Litigation.
The Oregon Supreme Court confronted these same arguments in Whitaker v. Bank
of Newport. 836 P.2d 695 (Or. 1992). In Whitaker. the plaintiffs alleged that their tort
claims were not barred by a previous contract action against the same party. In ruling that
the tort claims were barred by claim preclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court stated:
When a party has suffered various kinds of harm to the same
kind of interest at the hands of the same defendant, it is
reasonable to expect that all theories of recovery, whether in
contract or tort, will be explored in a single proceeding.
* * *

When a party commits a series of acts, each of which is at
least theoretically actionable as an individual case, but the
victim of those acts is a single party and the acts all were
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motivated by a common end, scheme or plan, it is reasonable
to treat all the acts as a single occasion for judicial relief.
* * *

[W]here two very different acts combine to cause a single
form of harm, the argument for preclusion is strengthened.
Moreover, the fact that succeeding cases involve tort and
contract is no reason to bar preclusion, where the complaining
party could have been made whole in one proceeding for both
kinds of harm done by the other party.
Id. at 700 (internal citations omitted).
For these reasons, the second requirement of claim preclusion is met in this case
because Scholzen could have and should have brought these claims in the Dockstader
Litigation.
B.

The Final Judgment Requirement is Met in this Case.

Finally, Scholzen argues that the third requirement of claim preclusion, final
judgment, is not met in this case because Scholzen1 s claims "were never presented in any
way to the court, therefore, none of Scholzen's tort claims against [the Palmers] were
fully litigated to a judgment on the merits." (App. Brief at 32). Scholzen's statement is
not only untrue, it reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the final judgment
requirement. Indeed, this Court recently rejected a similar argument in American Estate
Mgmt Corp.. 986 P.2d 765.
In American Estate Memt. Corp.. AEM filed a Complaint against IID for breach of
a separation agreement resulting from IID's failure to deed certain property to AEM. The
district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of IID on the breach of

308789.2

30

contract claim. AEM subsequently brought an action against IID claiming ownership to
the property by adverse possession. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of IID on the basis of claim preclusion. Id. at 766. In affirming the district court's
decision, this Court held that the claim preclusion barred the adverse possession claim
because it could have and should have been brought in the first action. Id. at 767-68.
With respect to the final judgment requirement, this Court held that the district court's
grant of summary judgment on the breach of contract claim in the first action "constituted
a judgment on the merits" for purposes of claim preclusion in the second action. Id. at
769.
Similarly, the final judgment requirement is satisfied in this case because Judge
Beacham, after considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to Scholzen,
granted summary judgment to the Palmers on Scholzen's claim that the Palmers agreed to
be bound by the Settlement Agreement and provide an additional easement to
Dockstader.

(R. 99-107).

Moreover, these specific claims were decided in the

Dockstader Litigation. Judge Beacham evaluated these claims pursuant to Scholzen's
Motion to Amend and ruled that "Scholzen has demonstrated virtually no factual basis for
the proposed claims." (R. 105). The doctrine of claim preclusion bars Scholzen from
doing so now.
As demonstrated above, all of the elements of claim preclusion are satisfied in this
case and the district court correctly dismissed the Complaint because Scholzen's claims
are barred by claim preclusion.
308789.2
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS OF ISSUE PRECLUSION.
The second branch of res judicata, collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, also bars

Scholzen's Complaint. Issue preclusion "prevents the relitigation of issues that have once
been adjudicated even though the claims for relief in the separate actions may be
different;' Harline v. Barken 912 P.2d 433, 442 (Utah 1996). The "minimum reach of
issue preclusion beyond precise repetition of the first action is to prevent relitigation by
mere introduction of cumulative evidence bearing on a simple historical fact that has once
been decided." Id. at 443. The "broad" reach of issue preclusion includes "efforts to
advance new arguments as to facts that had been fixed by the time of the first litigation."
Id
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, Scholzen is barred
from relitigating all of the material facts alleged in support of the Complaint. These facts
were decided adversely to Scholzen in the Dockstader Litigation.

(R. 98-107).

Consequently, Scholzen's claims against the Palmers should be dismissed because there
is no factual support for these claims.
In its brief, Scholzen correctly cites the elements of claim preclusion: (1) the issue
challenged must be identical in the previous action and in the case at hand; (2) the issue
must have been decided in a final judgment on the merits in the previous action; (3) the
issue must have been competently, fully and fairly litigated in the previous action; and (4)
the party against whom collateral estoppel is invoked in the current action must have been
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either a party or privy to a party in the previous action. (App. Brief at 32-33); Gardner v.
Madsen, 949 P.2d 785 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). As discussed further below, the district
court correctly dismissed the Complaint under the doctrine of issue preclusion because all
four requirements are satisfied in this case.
A.

The Issues in Both Cases Were Identical.

The first element of issue preclusion is met because the issues in the Dockstader
Litigation and this litigation are identical with respect to Scholzen's claims against the
Palmers. Scholzen, however, argues that the first requirement is not met because "the
issues raised by the complaint in this case are completely different" (App. Brief at 33).
Scholzen is wrong. In this case, Scholzen is attempting to advance new arguments
supported by facts that have already been decided in the Dockstader Litigation. (R. 99107). Specifically, the issue presented in the Dockstader Litigation was whether the
Palmers agreed to grant Dockstader an easement.

To support its position in the

Dockstader Litigation, Scholzen argued not only that the Palmers agreed to be bound by
the Settlement Agreement but that Scholzen was misled by the Palmers and that it relied
on the Palmers' misrepresentations in closing the sale of its interest in the real property to
the Palmers. (R. 103). Scholzen's evidence of these alleged representations consisted of
a fax cover sheet and a letter from Shawn Ferrin to Scholzen requesting information on
the Settlement Agreement. (R. 103).
In this case, Scholzen is once again arguing that the Palmers misled Scholzen and
that Scholzen relied on the Palmers' misrepresentations. (R. 1-12). Scholzen's efforts to
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differentiate the issues in this case as issues involving "intent" are unavailing. The facts
may be framed somewhat differently from the Dockstader Litigation, but the issue is
essentially the same: did the Palmers agree to provide an easement or represent to
Scholzen that they would provide an easement to Dockstader? The question has been
answered adversely to Scholzen by Judge Beacham in the Dockstader Litigation.
B.

There Was a Final Judgment in the Dockstader Litigation,

The second element of issue preclusion is met in this case because Judge Beacham
granted summary judgment in favor of the Palmers. Scholzen's argument that the second
element is lacking because Judge Beacham denied Scholzen's Motion to Amend simply
misses the point. After considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to
Scholzen, Judge Beacham found that the Palmers "never agreed to be bound by the
Settlement Agreement or to grant Dockstader [an easement]." (R. 99-107). Moreover,
Judge Beacham considered and rejected Scholzen's claim that it was "mislead" by the
"representations" of the Palmers because Scholzen provided "absolutely no evidence" to
support these allegations. (R. 103). Judge Beacham's decision was therefore a final
judgment on the merits. See American Estate Mgmt. Corp., 986 P.2d at 769; Sevy v.
Security Title Co.. 902 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1995) (requirement of final judgment on the
merits is met when court examines the substantive arguments of the parties and bases its
decision on related case law).
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C.

The Issues Were Competently, Fully and Fairly Litigated,

The issue of whether the Palmers agreed to provide Dockstader an easement or
misled Scholzen regarding its agreement to provide the easement were competently, fully
and fairly litigated in the Dockstader Litigation. As explained above, the Palmers and
Scholzen filed numerous memoranda and affidavits on these issues, including the
memoranda supporting and opposing Dockstader's two Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment, Scholzen's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Palmers' Motion for
Summary Judgment and Scholzen's Motion to Amend.

Scholzen's purported

"concession" on the Palmers' Motion for Summary Judgment notwithstanding, Scholzen
fully briefed and argued these issues at oral argument. Thus, the third element is satisfied
in this case.
D.

Scholzen was a Party to the Dockstader Litigation and This Litigation,

There is no dispute that the fourth element of issue preclusion is met in this case
because Scholzen was a party to the Dockstader Litigation.
Accordingly, because all of the elements of issue preclusion are satisfied in this
case, Scholzen was barredfromrelitigating the following issues: (1) whether the Palmers
agreed to be bound by the Settlement Agreement; (2) whether the Palmers otherwise
agreed to provide Dockstader with an easement; (3) whether the Palmers, through their
attorney, represented that they would be bound by the Settlement Agreement or provide
an easement; and (4) whether Scholzen reasonably relied on these alleged representations
in entering into the Purchase Agreement with the Palmers.
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Without these factual underpinnings, Scholzen's claims for fraud in the
inducement, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith and willful misconduct necessarily fail
and the district court correctly dismissed the Complaint.

See In re General

Determination, 982 P.2d at 70-71 (when findings in previous litigation are determinative
of the same issue in the present case, issue preclusion applies to bar relitigation of the
issue). Thus, the district court correctly dismissed the Complaint under the doctrine of
issue preclusion.
III.

DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RULE 12(B)(6) OF
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WAS APPROPRIATE.
Scholzen objects to the dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (App. Brief at 13-25). Scholzen's objection is too late.
In their memorandum in support of their Motion to Dismiss, the Palmers argued that the
Complaint should be dismissed for the additional reason that Scholzen failed to plead any
facts sufficient to support its claims of fraud in the inducement, negligent
misrepresentation, bad faith and willful misconduct. (R. 35-36). In opposing the Motion
to Dismiss, Scholzen, however, did not dispute this alternative basis for dismissing the
Complaint.

(R. 110-17). Rather, Scholzen only opposed the Palmers' res judicata,

collateral estoppel and damages arguments. (R. 113-17). Consequently, Scholzen may
not now challenge the dismissal of the Complaint on the basis of Rule 12 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125, 129-130
(Utah Ct. App. 1997).

308789.2

36

Nevertheless, the Palmers will briefly address the correctness of dismissing the
Complaint for failure to state a claim against the Palmers on which relief could be
granted.
A.

Fraud in the Inducement-Rescission and Damages.

Scholzen's first and second causes of action for fraud in the inducement were
correctly dismissed because Scholzen, in order to prevail, must prove each of the
following elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a representation was made; (2)
concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the
representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, know that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9)
to his injury and damage. Otsuka Elecs. v. Imaging Specialists. Inc.. 937 P.2d 1274,1278
(Utah Ct. App. 1997); Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Mvers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).
Even assuming all of the allegations in the Complaint are true, Scholzen cannot
establish that its reliance on the alleged representations of the Palmers was reasonable,
particularly in light of the fact that the Purchase Agreement, which contains an integration
clause, did not mention the Settlement Agreement or the easement. (R. 101-02).
A recent decision of this Court is particularly instructive on this point. In Maynard
v. Wharton, 912 P.2d 446 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the buyers and sellers entered into an
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earnest money agreement for the purchase of real property. After entering into the
agreement, they learned that the sellers did not own a portion of the real property referred
to as Lot 15. Prior to the closing of the sale, the buyers delivered closing instructions to
the sellers and the title company reserving their right to sue the sellers for damages and
fees because the sellers did not own Lot 15 as represented on the earnest money
agreement. The buyers and sellers then proceeded with the closing and signed a warranty
deed which excluded Lot 15. This Court refused to apply the fraud exception to the
merger doctrine because the buyers could not establish that they acted reasonably. This
Court acknowledged that the merger doctrine is "an admittedly harsh rule of law" and,
quoting the Utah Supreme Court, stated:
Nevertheless, Utah adheres to the merger doctrine because 'it
preserves the integrity of the final document of conveyance
and encourages the diligence of the parties.' Parties to real
estate transactions have a duty to 'make certain that their
agreements have in fact been fully included in the final
documents.' [Pjarties to the sale of real estate must confirm
that all agreements relating to conveyance of title are
incorporated into the deed before they tender or accept it.
Id. at 449 (emphasis in the original). See also Maack v. Resource Design & Construction,
Inc.. 875 P.2d 570, 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (reliance on alleged representations
regarding condition of house was not reasonable because the purchase agreement stated
that the house was sold "as is" and the agreement superseded any prior written or oral
agreement); Despain v. Despain. 855 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (no reasonable
reliance where plaintiff was represented by counsel in signing the quit claim deed and the
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status of the property was readily available for examination and inspection); Flemming v.
Flemming-Felt Co.. 323 P.2d 712, 715-716 (Utah 1958) (no fraud when the rights and
obligations of the charging party are clearly spelled out in the written documents, the
contents of which the charging party was entirely aware. The fact that the contract may
have placed him in a position of disadvantage or even hardship will not support a charge
of fraud in the inducement).
Scholzen attempts to circumvent the obvious impact of these decisions by arguing
that its reliance was reasonable because the Palmers "statements and actions" led
Scholzen to believe that the Palmers would be subject to the Settlement Agreement (App.
Brief at 17).8 This argument defies reason. This was an arms-length, commercial real
estate transaction that was fully documented pursuant to the Purchase Agreement and the
Warranty Deed. Both parties were represented by counsel. Scholzen has been unable to
produce one piece of paper that supports its assertion that the Palmers agreed to provide
Dockstader an easement.

8

In its brief, Scholzen frequently cites to its own Complaint as support for its assertions.
For example, Scholzen states that a "representation was made" because Shawn Ferrin
indicated that the Palmers were aware of the requirement to provide the easement and that
the Palmers would be subject to the Settlement Agreement. (App. Brief at 16-17, 20).
Scholzen then cites to its own Complaint. Judge Beacham clearly saw through such
unsubstantiated, self-serving statements when he ruled that there was "no evidentiary
foundation" for Scholzen's statement that "[the Palmers] acknowledged that the property
was subject to the Settlement Agreement" and that the letter from Shawn Ferrin submitted
by Scholzen to support this statement "does not support the assertion made." Judge
Beacham further found that other similar statements made by Scholzen in the Dockstader
Litigation were hearsay, inadmissible and not otherwise properly supported. (R. 100).
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Not only do the Purchase Agreement, which is an integrated document, and the
Warranty Deed fail to mention the easement, there is not even a letter from Mr. Dunn to
the Palmers confirming these so-called agreements and understandings. Under these
circumstances, Scholzen's purported reliance was not reasonable as a matter of law.
Dismissal of Scholzen's claim for fraud is also correct because Palmers' alleged
promise to provide an easement would be a "misrepresentation of intended future
performance." As such, it is not a "presently existing fact" upon which a claim for fraud
can be based. See Andalex Resources, Inc.. 871 P.2d at 1047 (misrepresentation of
intended future performance is not "presently existing fact" upon which a claim for fraud
can be based unless plaintiff can prove that defendant, at the time of representation, did
not intend to perform promise and made representation for purpose of deceiving the
plaintiff). And, as acknowledged by Scholzen, the Palmers entered into negotiations with
Dockstader for the easement after execution of the Purchase Agreement. (R. 1-12).
B.

Negligent Misrepresentation,

Scholzen also failed to plead any facts sufficient to establish a claim for negligent
misrepresentation. (R. 9). To prove negligent misrepresentation, Scholzen must establish
by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Palmers owed Scholzen some duty of care;
(2) that Scholzen was injured by its "reasonable reliance" on the Palmers' "careless or
negligent misrepresentation of a material fact"; (3) that the Palmers "had a pecuniary
interest in the transaction, were in a superior position to know the material facts; and (4)
that the Palmers should have reasonably foreseen" that Scholzen was likely to rely upon
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the fact. See Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & GunnelL 713 P.2d 55, 59-60 (Utah
1986); Dugan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980). Scholzen must also prove that the
Palmers owed Scholzen some duty of care. See Ellis v. Hale. 373 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah
1962) (To establish liability for negligent misrepresentation, there must be a "special duty
of care running from the representor to the representee" which does not exist when parties
are dealing at arm's length).
As stated above, the Palmers and Scholzen were on the opposite sides of an armslength transaction. Both parties were represented by counsel. The Palmers were not in a
fiduciary or other similar special relationship with Scholzen. Even assuming the Palmers
had such a duty, Scholzen's purported reliance on these alleged representations was not
justifiable or reasonable. As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Jardine v. Brunswick
Corp.. 423 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1967):
The one who complains of being injured by such a false
representation cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever is
told him, but has the duty of exercising such degree of care to
protect his own interests as would be exercised by an
ordinary, reasonable and prudent person under the
circumstances; and if he fails to do so, is precluded from
holding someone else to account for the consequences of his
own neglect.
Consequently, dismissal of Scholzen's claim for negligence misrepresentation is
appropriate for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
C.

Bad Faith,

Similarly, Scholzen's claim for bad faith was correctly dismissed because
Scholzen pled no set of facts that would support a cause of action for bad faith. (R. 9-10).
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Although the covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most contractual
relationships, it does not create a new and independent duty on the Palmers' to provide an
easement that is not found in the Purchase Agreement. See Andalex Resources, Inc.. 871
P.2d at 1048 (The covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be consitrued to establish
new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties).

Accordingly,

Scholzen's fifth cause of action for bad faith was correctly dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
D,

Willful Misconduct

Finally, the Complaint fails to plead any facts that would support Scholzen's claim
of willful misconduct. (R. 11). Consequently, Scholzen's sixth cause of action was
correctly dismissed for the same reasons as stated above.
IV.

DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE
SCHOLZEN SUFFERED NO DAMAGES.
Scholzen's Complaint against the Palmers was also correctly dismissed because

Scholzen did not suffer any damages as a result of the Palmers' alleged conduct and
therefore the Complaint was premature. The Dockstader Litigation is ongoing and there
has been no determination that Scholzen is liable to Dockstader for damages. Indeed, a
trial date has been set for May 1-3,2000.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above, the Court should affirm the district court's
dismissal of the Complaint.
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DATED this /£_ day of January, 2000.

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

D. VEASY
LAURA S. SCOTT
Attorneys for Appellees
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an envelope addressed as follows:
Clifford V.Dunn
170 North 400 East, Suite G
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